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REPORT OF THE CAB SPECIAL STAFF ON
REGULATORY REFORM: GENERAL CONCLUSION
AND PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
HE GENERAL conclusion of the Special Staff on Regulatory
Reform is that protective entry control, exit control, and pub-
lic utility-type price regulation under the Federal Aviation Act are
not justified by the underlying cost and demand characteristics of
commercial air transportation. The industry is naturally competi-
tive, not monopolistic. In the absence of economic regulation, it is
clear that monopoly abuses would not occur. Service quality and
price would be highly responsive to demand because of the imme-
diate threat of new entry even in markets served by a single carrier.
Most important for the long term, the possibility of new entry will
assure that the system will be composed of highly efficient carriers
able to adapt readily to changing conditions.
The present system of regulation causes higher than necessary
costs and prices (which in turn suppress demand), weakens the
ability of carriers to respond to market demand and other constantly
changing conditions, narrows the range of price/quality choices to
the user, and thus produces a misallocation of the nation's economic
resources.
These undesirable effects outweigh the benefits of such regula-
tion. Market demand and not protective regulation is very largely
responsible for the size and extent of the present airline system, ex-
cept for some directly subsidized service. Neither the provision of
uneconomic service nor the toleration of unnecessarily high costs
due to inefficient conduct by airlines and airline labor can be con-
sidered benefits; to the extent some small amount of nonsubsidized
uneconomic service is provided by reason of license requirements,
passengers in other markets are being overcharged and demand de-
pressed; and the user, as well as the overall economy, is similarly
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paying for inefficiences-excessive service, labor and other costs-
resulting from government policies designed to ensure the stability
and artificially determine the market share of particular airlines
through protective regulation.
Economic inefficiencies deriving from protective regulation are
for the most part not the product of the CAB administration of the
law, but of the law itself. Over the years the CAB has administered
both rate and route policy liberally, but this is not likely to continue
if market growth and carrier fortunes decline because of external
conditions. On the contrary, it is possible that regulation will be-
come more restrictive and thereby increase inefficiences. Real im-
provement in economic efficiency can come only if protective regul-
lation is eliminated or materially reduced. On the other hand, it is
important to recognize that tinkering with the regulatory regime
while preserving its fundamental features may be ineffective or pro-
duce perverse consequences.
Accordingly, the Special Staff recommends that protective entry,
exit and public utility-type price control in domestic air transpor-
tation be eliminated within three to five years by statutory amend-
ment to the Federal Aviation Act. Because closed entry is the sine
qua non of economic regulation from the point of view of the air-
lines and allied interests, open entry is in one sense tantamount to
"deregulation."
The Special Staff does not, however, advocate removing other
Federal controls. On the contrary, those features of airline regula-
tion which appear to be required to protect the public interest
should be maintained and strengthened. In addition, new require-
ments to assure the maintenance of safe operations should be adopt-
ed, and measures should be taken to prevent or ameliorate market
imperfections caused by external factors relating to airports, the
fuel allocation program and State regulation.
For the promotion of safety, it is recommended that temporary
licenses for airlines be issued upon proof of financial fitness, that
renewal be based on continuing proof of financial fitness, and that
FAA surveillance be strengthened. The government should also be
empowered to promulgate insurance and bonding requirements, as
well as other measures reasonably necessary to assure that safety lev-
els are not degraded by reason of the economic condition of indi-
vidual airlines.
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Subsidized small community service should be maintained by
means of low-bid contracts awarded to operationally and financially
qualified carriers. By this means, uneconomic service which appears
to be genuinely necessary in the public interest can be maintained
at a cost far less than that now incurred for the subsidization of lo-
cal service airlines. Authority over antitrust matters, including pre-
datory conduct and mergers, should be retained or expanded; and
carriers should continue to be required to file and adhere to both
tariffs and schedules, as well as to report financial, traffic, and per-
formance data for public dissemination.
The precise scope and language of these legislative proposals
should be worked out by an independent public body, such as the
proposed National Commission on Regulatory Reform, which
would report directly to the Congress. Such a body would also de-
termine whether the regulatory functions above described should
remain in the CAB or be performed by other agencies. A transi-
tion period of three to five years will provide time for the Com-
mission to work out the legislation, for Congressional considera-
tion of the proposals, and for the airlines and allied interests to
prepare for the more competitive environment that has been rec-
ommended.
Pending implementation of the principal recommendation,
above, and independently of that recommendation if it is not ef-
fected, it is proposed that the Board support a legislative program
and pursue certain prescribed policies in the administration of its
principal regulatory functions. These proposals have been formu-
lated to be consistent with the principal statutory purpose of the
existing regime of protective regulation and at the same time: (i)
increase the price/quality options available to the American trav-
eling and shipping public; (ii) encourage greater efficiency through
price competition and regulatory actions which will keep price, and
therefore costs, lower than they would otherwise be; and (iii) open
defined sectors or zones of air transportation to regulation by mar-
ket forces by removing entry and price controls in order to stimu-
late price competition, innovation and new services.
The interim proposal is in two parts, as follows:
(1) Statutory and other changes designed to create or widen
less regulated zones
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The Board should press for legislation designed to authorize
it to:
-Open entry for supplemental (charter only) carriers
(subject to continuing proof of financial fitness) and grad-
ually liberalize charter rules under legislation giving the
Board authority to define "charters" as any full-up opera-
tion;'
-Open entry for all-cargo carriers (subject to continuing
proof of financial fitness) and eliminate price controls in
respect to domestic cargo air transportation in stages over
a period of two years;
-Establish a low-bid contract system for the provision of
small community subsidized air service (or any other un-
economic service that is deemed to be required); and sim-
ultaneously (a) commence a gradual phase-out of certifi-
cated local service carrier small community operations and
subsidy, and (b) allow economically unregulated com-
muter carriers to use aircraft of up to fifty-five revenue
seats (instead of the present thirty).
(2) Discretionary policy changes
The Board should administer rate, route, charter, and other
policies so as to preserve the financial integrity of existing carriers,
and also:
-Consider whether to establish ceiling fares under which
carriers could reduce prices in response to competitive and
other changing conditions subject to prohibitions against
unlawful discrimination, predatory conduct, and causing
other carriers to be placed in financial jeopardy;
-Continue to perfect and expand domestic passenger fare
standards with a view to creating incentives (as opposed to
mandatory requirements) for greater carrier efficiency, and
utilize these to determine the ceiling, if a ceiling approach
is adopted;
-Gradually liberalize charter rules consistently with the
development of normal fare ceilings to widen the price/
quality choice for consumers, and thus encourage price
1 The latter is a current Board proposal.
2This was proposed by the Board in 1972 and 1973, but no legislative action
was taken.
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competition for discretionary travel between supplemental
and scheduled carriers;
-Expand route authority in accordance with demand and
to permit congested large-hub airports to be by-passed,
perfect the authority of local service carriers in on-line mar-
kets, approve new competitive authority to correct defi-
ciencies or to improve services, and to the extent feasible,
select the most efficient carrier among competing appli-
cants; and
-Continue to discourage or disapprove mergers between
large or viable carriers.
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